Loyalty In Odyssey Essay Research Paper LoyaltyIn free essay sample

Loyalty In Odyssey Essay, Research Paper Loyalty In The Odyssey by Homer, the scene when Odysseus Canis familiaris Argos recognized him after 19 old ages of absence, along with Eumaios still esteeming his maestro greatly showed that a loyal individual in the Odyssey or even in the Grecian society will be respected while the disloyal are despised. Unlike unpatriotic characters such as Melanthios, the reader respects characters that put responsibility over personal addition in The Odyssey. The Characters get what they deserve in the Odyssey, if they are respectable, they normally end up good, if they are unpatriotic, they end up bad. Both Argos and Odysseus did non bury each other during their 19 old ages of separation. Even when Argos is weak, dirty, and death, he still tried to demo fondness toward Odysseus by wagging his tail, and puting his ears back. This showed that his trueness towards Odysseus neer faded despite his maestro s absence. We will write a custom essay sample on Loyalty In Odyssey Essay Research Paper LoyaltyIn or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page When Odysseus recognized Argos, and realized he neer forgot about him, Odysseus becomes emotional, and wiped a bead of tear off. I was touched after reading this scene, and it was difficult to disregard my regard and sympathy towards Argos. Not merely the animate beings display this kind of allegiance, nevertheless since Argos was loyal, the reader respects this character. Eumaios, the pigman, besides embodies the features of a faithful retainer. Like Argos, even when Odysseus is speculated as dead, Eumaios still refers to Odysseus as his maestro: I call him my Maestro, though he is absent. His sort intervention of the mendicant, who was really Odysseus, shows he is a good individual in general, non merely to his maestro. The fact that Eumaios sleeps with Odysseus hogs every N ight greatly reinforces this form of being loyal. He was so loyal that in order to take attention of his absent maestro s support he sacrificed himself. I respected Eumaios because he treated the belongings as if he expected Odysseus to return at dawn. In the terminal, he besides helped Odysseus in the feast hall conflict. His ultimate destiny was non due to luck, but instead a life of sturdy devotedness. Not all of Odysseus s retainers emulated this ideal. Melanthios, to the reverse was the exact antonym of Eumaios. He ignored his responsibility as a goat herder by presenting the caprine animals to the suers alternatively of protecting Odysseus belongings. Even though Odysseus has been gone for a long clip, he should still make his occupation because Penelope was still his maestro. Even though the goat herder insulted Odysseus inadvertently, the writer used dramatic sarcasm here to stress the servant s foolhardiness. The reader knows Odysseus was in camouflage, and he was keeping in his choler, but Melanthios didn t. He kicked him on the street, he tried to state Odysseus to go forth his ain house, and he even helps the suers during the feast. These scenes foreshadowed Melanthios barbarous executing later in the narrative. In decision, the loyal characters in The Odyssey had a good terminal to them, and the unpatriotic characters all suffered. Since Homer wrote this drama 100s of old ages ago, this shows that in the Grecian society trueness was an of import feature to hold. ( In a universe of great uncertainness, the devotedness of Alliess, friends, and retainers can non be overlooked. Though the times have changed, the value of fidelity has non. Like Odysseus, each of us should measure our friends and Alliess before puting complete trust in them.

Kemble Knight Essays - Sarah Kemble Knight, Knight, Kemble Family

Kemble Knight Essays - Sarah Kemble Knight, Knight, Kemble Family Kemble Knight Sarah Kemble Knight. Journal. Group A: Our group found passages to support the idea that Knight was courageous. On the first day of their journey they encountered a thick swamp On the second day they crossed a river which greatly terrified knight. She goes on to say I now ralyed all the courage I was mistress of ... (now would seem like a good time for a woman from the city to call it quits!) On day three Knight can not cross the river because the water is too high at present so she stays at a little cottage. Knight says, this little Hutt was one of the wretchedest I ever saw a habitation for human creatures. Also on day three Knight says an Indian-like Animal come to the door. If knight is concerned about her safety she doesn't write about it. On December 21 they encounter a great storm of wind and snow. Winter probably wasn't a good time to take a road trip! Group B: By taking her journey, Sarah Kemble Knight proved her self-reliance and independence. Here are a few dates and instances that really stood out in our minds. Oct. 2nd- Knight bribes John to leave with her. Oct. 3rd- She begins to conquer her fear of drowning by crossing the water in a canoe. Oct. 4th- Knight survived the cruel treatment by Mr. Devills and his daughters. Dec. 21st- Knight makes it through illness without much distress. March 3rd- Knight shows her inner strength in that she could be away from her child for so long.

The evaluation report Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3500 words

The evaluation report - Assignment Example From the analysis it is found that Landor has to incorporate a Design oriented work culture. Also it was found that Landor lacks an inclusive growth model. Landor can be rated very high in terms of brand equity. Similarly, Street Voice appeared to have a highly differentiating factor from others. But it lacks an inclusive growth model and expansion plan. Table of Contents Sl. No Topic Page No. 1 Introduction 3 - 5 2 Main Body 5 - 9 3 Analysis 9 - 13 Analysis of Landor using Four Powers of Design Management Analysis of Landor using DM Staircase Analysis of Street Voice using Four Powers of Design Management Analysis of Street Voice using DM Staircase 4 Conclusion 13 Introduction Design Management is a very comprehensive process for the success of any business organisation. â€Å"Simply put, design management is the business side of design.† (DMI, 2011) Design Management is an all encompassing term. It refers to the process of integration of strategies of the business to its eve ryday functioning for the benefit of creating better products or services. Therefore, to have a better design management in process in an organisation, a company should have a good business strategy, good product and production policy and a drive for continuous innovation. Thus it can be seen that design management is not a separate functional activity in an organisation. It is an activity that requires continuous attention and contribution of all the functional departments in an organisation. However, the ultimate authority for a better design management in an organisation lies with the top level executives or the chief strategists. Considering the growing importance of design management in the modern business management, most of the premium management institutes have introduced it as an important course of study. Design of a business can be classified mainly into three broad categories namely Strategic Design, Industrial Design and Service Design. (BDI, 2011) Strategic design comp rises of the vision and mission of a business. It lays out the framework for an organisation’s mode of operation. Industrial design is the area that involves policies regarding technology, engineering, branding and the like. Service design comprise of policies regarding people, infrastructure, public relations, etc. This report is intended to give an evaluation of design management in the present time with reference to two business organisations of different industries Landor Strategic Brand and Consulting Company and Street Voice Company of media industry. Landor is a company which was established in the year 1941. Landor is one of the major consulting companies in the world with a presence of more than 20 offices in 16 countries. (Landor.com, 2011) Landor is a specialised brand consultant and provides its services to all the big names in the industry as well as the emerging players. Therefore, Landor helps the clients with Industrial design of design management. Starbucks, Pepsico, Coca Cola, Apple, Adidas, etc are some of the clients of Landor. The core strategy of Landor is to provide services to businesses that are facing challenges with branding issues. As Landor is a brand consulting company, it hardly interacts with the ultimate consumers. But the services rendered by them are entirely based on the requirements of the ultimate cons

Ending life ethics Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Ending life ethics - Essay Example The two principles are related because beneficence requires patients to make informed decisions and physicians to respect the decisions. It also requires physicians to guide patients against making decisions that are contrary to their best interest. The principle of autonomy can help the two doctors to respond to John’s condition. Doctors should guide patients in making their decisions by informing them about the consequences of their decisions. The two doctors failed to honor this principle by failing to inform John about the consequences of administering no treatment on him. The patient has the right to access relevant information from doctors to guide him in making his decisions. However, the two doctors should use this principle and communicate with John about the consequences of his decision. A mentally fit patient has the right to withhold his earlier decision. Dr. W. respects John’s will that he should not receive any additional treatment. This conflicts with the principle of beneficence, which requires that their actions be directed towards the best interest of John. The best interest in this case is saving his life. Furthermore, John had withheld his previous decision and requested the doctors to do something. The doctors should respect this not because it is demand of the principle of beneficence but because it is the wish of the patient. However, this will raise another question on whether the decision of a patient who is under the influence of health conditions should replace his original decision or preference. John’s second decision is as a result of despair due to his health condition. It is common for circumstances and other... This essay focuses on ethical issues and principles of life ending. Biomedical ethics refers to the principles that govern the morals, judgment and values in medicine. There are many principles that govern the behavior and action of doctors and other medical staff in the profession. Ethical dilemma arises when, for example, the values of the hospital (medical profession) conflict with the values of the patient or his family members. Such cases require the use of the key principles that will assist one in understanding and responding to the cases. Doctors choose the best course of action to take on patient with the help of these principles. Doctors and other medical staff should observe the principles behind these ethics to help them in solving ethical dilemma. Application of these principles requires clear communication channels between all the parties involved. It is clear that patients make decisions out of some influences that are beyond their control. Physicians should guide the patients in making their decisions. Patients have the right to use medical information to make their decisions but doctors should make sure that the decisions made acknowledge all consequences. Improving the welfare of patients should be the motive of all doctors. Physicians should be able to gauge the conditions that influence the decision of a patient and use their knowledge in determining the viability of decisions made. They should guide patients in making decisions regarding their health conditions and preferences.

Business and economics Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Business and economics - Assignment Example That was the year the UK economy went into recession, pushed to the brink by the global financial contagion, together with rising levels of debt in the consumer market, as well as sharp falls in the prices of residential properties. The recession spurred government into pump-priming mode, spending on government projects to spur the economy, taking a stake in the banking system and effectively nationalizing portions of that system, reducing taxation, and putting on hold curbs on government borrowing. These acts pushed Britain to the opposite end of another brink, and that is an elevation of public debts, and the ballooning of the public deficit levels, that then spurred the government of Cameron, formed with the support of both Democrats and Conservatives, to initiate a five-year plan of austere reforms in 2010. The goal of the program was the reduction of the budget deficit to just a percent of GDP by 2015, from 10 percent of GDP at the start of 2010. By the next year, the government announced an extension of the austerity program through to 2017, owing to the perceived inadequacy of the interventions to effect change, the lower than desired rates of growth in the economy, and the effects of the crisis sparked by the debt problems in many parts of the EU (Central Intelligence Agency 2013). There was an increase in VAT in 2011 to 20 percent from 17.5 percent as part of the measures tied to this program. Meanwhile, the tax rates for companies in the UK were targeted to go down in 2014 to just 21 percent. Also, $605 billion was earmarked for a program to purchase assets by the end of 2012. In all, 2012 was characterized by public deficit levels that stuck persistently in the range of 7.7 percent of the GDP, above targets; a 0.1 percent contraction in the GDP; tepid spending by consumers; tepid investment levels among business concerns; and the continued rise in the levels of public debts (Central

Evaluating Agency Theorys Strengths and Weaknesses

Evaluating Agency Theorys Strengths and Weaknesses Agency theory refers to contract whereby principal engage with agent to perform some act on their behalf. The act involved giving power to agent for some decision making. Everyone work on the feet of benefit that can be gained for oneself. Thats why it is strongly agreeable that agent, as a utility maximizer will not act at the best interest of principal. Therefore, agents may cheat if they were not monitored by principal and principal, on the other hand, must bear agency cost to avoid suffering loss. These agency costs includes monitoring costs of agent, bonding costs whereby agent will try to show that they are not self-serving, and residual losses that are too costly to monitor. In general, agency cost is one of a type of internal cost incurred from, or must be paid to, an agent acting on behalf of a principal. Agency costs mainly originated from the separation of control, divergence of ownership and control and the different objectives (rather than shareholder maximization) of the managers. For example, difference of interest between shareholders and management. Shareholders hope that management could operate the company in a manner that increases shareholder value. But management may wish to run the company in ways that can maximize their personal authority  and well-being  that may not be in favor of the shareholders. From the paper, Jensen and Mecklings (1976), they used zero agency-cost firms whereby the manager is the firm sole shareholder as a reference point of comparison for all other cases of ownership and management structures. At one utmost of ownership and management structures are firms whose managers possess 100 percent of the firm. These firms, by their definition, have no agency costs. At the other utmost are firms whose managers are employees with no equity in the firm. In between are firms where the managers possess some, but not all, of their firms equity. They stated that agency costs are higher among firms that are not 100 percent owned by their managers and these costs increase as the equity share of the owner-manager declines. In other words, agency costs increases with a reduction in managerial ownership. In situation (where the managers own some, but not all, of their firms equity) whereby monitoring cost were included by equity holder to alter the opportunity the owner-manager has for possessing non-monetary benefits can decrease the owner-managers consumption of perquisites. Examples of monitoring cost include auditing and budget restrictions. However, owner-managers will still willingly enter into the contract as it will increase the firms value. The particular increase in the value of the firm that accrues will be reflected in the owners wealth, but his welfare will be increased by less than this because he forgoes some non-monetary benefits he previously enjoyed. In situation (where the managers own some, but not all, of their firms equity) whereby owner-manager expands resources to guarantee to equity holder that he would limit his activities, bonding cost incurred. Examples of bonding cost include contractual limitation on managers decision making power and auditing of financial account by public accountant. If the bonding costs were all under owner-managers control, he will gain the benefit as such of monitoring costs gives. In a nutshell, the manager finds it in his interest to incur these costs as long as the net increments in his wealth which they generate (by reducing the agency costs and therefore increasing the value of the firm) are more valuable than the perquisites given up. Although by incurring the monitoring and bonding cost increases the efficiency of firm, it does not maximize the firms value. This is because, the cost of separation of ownership and control occurred as a result of differences between efficient solution of zero monitoring and bonding cost and value of firm when there is positive monitoring cost. And Jensen and Mecklings (1976) showed that agency cost will be positive as long as monitoring costs are positive. Size and existence of agency cost depends greatly on the nature of monitoring costs, the needs of managers for non-monetary benefits and supply of potential managers who are able to finance the firm with personal wealth. Agency cost of debt indicates that there will be a rise in cost of debt when there is difference in the point of views of bondholders and management. There are a few fractions of agency costs of debts. The first one is the incentive effects related with debts. An owner-manager will intend to involve in investments with high risk and high profits with the financial structure of debt-typed claims because the loss will bear by debt-holder. For example where there are two investment options, A and B. The option B will help owner-manager to gain more equity, while the option A will give back more profit to bondholder. The choice of investment will only been done after the bonds are sold. Bondholders buy bonds from the company and suppose the company to invest in option A. However, due to the incentive effect, the manager did not invest as they expected but invest in option B which will help them gain more in equity. This will cause welfare loss to the bondholders. However, this decision c ould be realized by bondholders. If the bondholders knew the choice of the manager, they will only willing to buy the bonds at a lower price. Due to this action, the overall firm value may decrease. This reduction of firm value will be the residual loss which is also known as agency cost. This amount of agency cost is liable to owner-manager. Monitoring and bonding costs are another fraction of agency costs. In order to preserve the benefits of their own, bondholder will restrict the managements decisions. They will set contracts in details to monitor the owner-managers behavior. The contracts may influence the capacity of the management to make the best decision and decrease the profit of the firm. The decrease of the profit, the cost of enforcing the contracts and all the other costs related with the contracts are the monitoring costs. As the monitoring costs are borne by owner-manager, he will hope to minimize the monitoring cost, and therefore he will incur bonding costs. The bonding costs are incurred to give assurance to the bondholder that he will not turn aside from his promised behavior. He will only voluntarily bond himself in contract when such deed benefits him. Bankruptcy and reorganization costs are also one of the components of the agency costs of debts. Bankruptcy occurs when the firm unable to pay debt obligation. The cost of bankruptcy is always the interest of the potential buyers of fixed claims. This is because this cost will decrease their payoffs if the bankruptcy happens. If the probability of the bankruptcy cost is high, the willingness of the price buyer to pay for fixed claims will be low. The value lost because of the cost of bankruptcy will be the agency costs. The probability of bankruptcy will negatively affect the operating costs and the incomes of the firm. A firm may need to pay higher salaries in order to keep engaged the employees in the firm when the probability of the firm gone high. Besides, the firms that provide after sales services will also face decrease of sales volume. There are some factors that encourage the firms to use corporate debts although the factors discussed above will discourage them. Tax subsidy on interest payments is one of the factors. There are some theories verified that the use of risky debt will increase the value of the firm because of the tax subsidy on the interest payments. The firm will enjoy the benefits if in the end the benefit of tax subsidy covered the agency costs that incurred from debt. Furthermore, the firm will also be motivated to use corporate debt when there is a profitable investment while the firm has insufficient fund to invest. The firm will incur them provided that the profits generated from investment are greater than the marginal agency costs of debts. There is some critical variables to be concerned besides the amount of debt and equity for a given size firm, such as inside equity (Si) held by the manager, ouside equity (So) and debt (B) held by anyone ouside of the firm. Therefore, the term of ownership structure is applied rather than capital structure. Besides that, we have to identify that the cost to be inccured is related to the use of debt or outside equity in a firm. A firm which is facing capital limitation can finance the full capital value of its present and future projects if there are other individuals in the economy who have large enough amount of personal capital to finance the firm. Besides that, a firm can prevent property lossess related to the agency costs due to the sale of debt or outside equity. If not, the firm needs to acquire the excess capital in the debt market with the absence of such individuals. As a result, the owner-manager is the individual who bears the agency costs since the project is unprofitable enough to cover existing costs included agency costs. So, it is important for owner-manager who bears these costs to reduce the agency costs in order to increase his property. If the capital markets, such as the value of assets where the debt and outside equity is eficient enough to indicate the agency costs estimation with unbiased, these agency costs will bear by the selling owner-manager. So, the task of owner-manager who will take the risk to bear the cost of agency is to determine the perfect ratio of ouside equity to debt, So/B. Therefore, from the owner-managers point of view, the optimal ratio of outside funds to be acquire from equity to debt for a given level of internal equity is that E which results in minimum total agency costs, E*= So* /(B â‚ ¬Ã‚ «Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚  So ) The total market value of the equity is S = Si+So, The total market value of the firm is V = S+B. 0 E*= (So/ B + So) At(E= ASo(E) + AB(E) AB(E) ASo(E) At(E*) Figure 1 We assume that the size of the firm is remain constant and the actual value of the firm V, will rely on the agency costs incurred. Figure 1 indicate the agency costs is divided into two separate components, ASo(E) represents the total agency costs of outside equity holders by the owner-manager and AB(E) represents the total agency costs of debt incurred in the ownership structure. A Ã‚ ´(E) = ASo(E) + AB(E) is the total agency cost. The optimal proportion of outside financing shown as E* where total agency costs is minimum, AT(E*). When E ºÃ¢â€š ¬Ã‚  So/(B+So) is zero, there is no outside equity, the managers intention to use the outside equity is zero. As E increases, his incentives to exploit the outside equity is increase and hence the agency costs ASo(E) increase. When the outside equity So = E = 0, there are a maximum of outside funds are acquire from debt. As the amount of debt decreases to zero, these costs, AB(E) decrease because his intention to rearrange wealth from the bondholders to himself falls. It is because the total amount of debt reduce, and therefore it is more easier to rearrange any amount given to the debtholders. Besides that, his reallocation shares which is accomplished is falling since So is rising and therefore inside equity, Si/(So+Si), his share of the total equity is falling. At(E* Ko) E*(Ko) At(E* K1) E*(K1) AB(E K0) ASo(E K0) AB(E K1) AS0(E K1) K1) High outside financing Low outside financing Figure 2. Agency cost functions and optimal ouside equity as a fraction of total outside financing, E*(K), for two different levels of outside financing. In order to identify the consequences of rising the amount of outside financing, and therefore decrease the amount of equity held by the manager,Si, the value of the firm, V* remain constant. The net consequence of the greater used of outside financing given the cost functions in figure 2 is to increase the total agency costs from A Ã‚ ´(E*;Ko) to A Ã‚ ´(E*;K1), and to increase the optimal portion of outside funds acquired from the sale of outside equity. Therefore, the larger the firm may incurred higher total agency costs due to the monitoring function is internally more difficult and expensive in a larger organization. At(K V*1) At(k V*o) At(E K V*) Total agency costs 0 Fraction of firm financed by outside claims KFig. 3. Total agency costs as a function of the fraction of the firm financed by outside claims for two firm sizes, V*1>V*o. Of course, there are certain risks when the owner-manager demanded for outside financing. If the owner-manager is alway relies on outside funding, he will have his entire treasure invested in the firm. Therefore, he would not optional to outside funding until he had invested 100 percent of his personal wealth in the firm. Since, the manager who invests all of his wealth in a firm, he will bear a welfare loss. However, he can prevent the agency costs when he increasing relies on outside funding by taking certain actions. If the returns from assets are not totally correlated with the project, an individual can decrease the riskiness of the returns on his part by dividing his treasure into different assets by diversifying. Of course, he will be contributed to become a minority stockholder in order to avoid this risk by suffer a wealth loss as he reduces his proportion ownership because prospective shareholders and bondholders will take into account the agency costs. The analysis of this paper is only related with a single investment-financing decision and has excluded the issues of incentives which influencing future financing-investment decisions. However, some changes have been made to conclude that the costs and benefits will be changed by the expectation of future sales of outside equity and debt which may benefit to the manager himself. If he brings out a high probability of chance for dealing business, he probably can gain a big amount of future capital from outside sources and it will help to increase the business benefit and reduce the size of the agency costs. But, finite life of individual cannot eliminate the agency cost because it needs to consider more on his successors who think of own benefit and interest. Normally, they assumed that all outside equity are no right to vote. The manager will suffer the decreasing of his partial ownership in the long-run welfare and limit his action to control over the corporation and even fire the manager if they have right to vote. Besides, if the costs of decreasing the dispersion of ownership are lesser than the benefits to be acquired from decreasing the agency costs, it will pay some individual to purchase the shares in the market to decrease the dispersion of ownership. Moreover, they proposed an alternative way for the owner-manager who carried both equity and debt outstanding to get rid of the agency costs of debt. It will be no incentive if he is bound contractually to have a portion of the total debt equal to his partial ownership of the total equity. If the manager is getting balance between the debt and equity holders, the net effect will be zero. But, the limitation is they have not conduct to the large corporation and just perform in the small company which cause them couldnt have a clear picture on formal contract of reducing agency cost. Theory of Monitoring is a major part of the analysis which they expected monitoring activities help to develop particular characteristics to those institutions and individuals will be given a lot of advantages through these activities. The analysis demonstrates that the degree of security analysis activities will lower the agency costs related with the division of ownership and control, and they are socially productive absolutely. Furthermore, they supported that there are a lot of advantages of the security analysis activity to be played in the bigger capital value of the ownership claims to firms which is not in the day to day portfolio returns if this analysis is correct. If the firm can make the private returns to analysis same with the private costs of such activity, the security analysis will be balanced. However, the analysis will not reveal the social product of this activity which will include high level output and capital value of ownership claims. Therefore, the argument s uggests that, it will be overwhelming when the shareholders pay straightforwardly to have the perfect monitoring conducted if there is imperfect of security analysis being conducted. The problems discovered in the study included Pareto inefficient which is the obtainable set of financial claims on outcomes in a market fails to extent the fundamental step. An inadequacy conclusion is generally come out without clear attention to the costs of discovering latest claims or costs of maintaining the expanded set of markets which refer to the welfare improvement. But, the problem is the difficulty of formulation a positive analysis of the maximum level of individual behaviors in the economy that may influence them to generate and sell contingent claims. So, self-interested maximizing behavior of individuals becomes the first step in the way of implementing a study of the supply of markets issue. They suppose that planning the question of the perfect markets in terms of the combine both the demand and supply conditions will be very productive instead of implicitly assuming that latest claims from independent human effort.

HMO Regulation Essay -- essays research papers

HMO Regulation Health Maintenance Organizations, or HMO’s, are a very important part of the American health care system. Also referred to as managed care programs, HMO's are combinations of doctors and insurance companies that are formed into one organization. This organization provides treatment to its members at fixed costs and decides on what treatment, if any, will be given based on the patient's or doctor's current health plan. Sometimes, no treatment is given at all. HMO's main concerns are to control costs and supposedly provide the best possible treatment to their patients. But it seems to the naked eye that instead their main goal is to get more people enrolled so that they can maintain or raise current premiums paid by consumers using their service. For HMO's, profit comes first- not patients' lives. HMO’s are groups of doctors hired by insurance companies and are usually controlled or regulated by the hospitals who facilitate them. The majority of this limitation is due to pressure from within the organization or government pressure. The government influences hospitals into denying treatment in order to cut federal costs. These government actions generally result in a revision of private employee health care claims, and in turn certain businesses can no longer afford to provide health insurance for their employees. Consequently, approximately 50 to 60 million people go without insurance for at least one month each year. Many HMO’s constantly evaluate their services to "ensure" the best care and coverage. But in many cases, what is happening is the exact opposite. HMO's can and do conduct their business quite ruthlessly. Patients are continuously unable to receive the necessary treatment due to the insufficient HMO coverage. Many HMO's actually make more money if their doctors see or treat fewer patients. According to the Associated Press, â€Å"Consumers who have been denied a treatment that the HMO says is not covered, or who inadvertently fail to follow HMO guidelines in seeking treatment and are therefore denied reimbursement, will continue to have little recourse.† (2) Many people must drive for hours, generally sick or injured, simply to receive treatment from a doctor that will be covered by their HMO. Another downfall to HMO coverage is selective-contracting. This is a process where hospitals deny treatment to patients because their... ...ts to cover their mistakes. This is the exact opposite of what the country needs. Why should costs go up because of denied treatment? The big concern is whether or not government really understands the great difficulty in trying to control HMO’s and other health care programs without a nationalized program. Since there are some 6 million people using Medicare in HMO’s something needs to be done to ensure these patients the treatment that they need. In conclusion, there still needs to be a lot of work done to health care in the United States. Other nations provide universal health care to their citizens, but this would cause dilemmas in balancing two often conflicting policy goals: providing the public with equitable access to needed pharmaceuticals while controlling the costs. Universal health care probably would not work in the U.S. because our nation is so diverse and our economy is so complex. The system we have now obviously has its problems, and there is a lot of rom for improvement. HMO’s will still create problems for people and their medical bills, but they definitely should be monitored to see that their patients are receiving just treatment.